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Chile has failed to ratify the 1991 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) as
stipulated in the free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States. Since Chile is amongst the US PriorityWatch List
countries, it is imperative for Chile to emanate a UPOV1991-compliant law. The ratiﬁcation of UPOV1991, however,
has encountered strong resistance within the country and it is not yet clear when and how Chile will adopt UPOV 1991
provisions. Through an analysis of legal and economic aspects of the domestic plant variety law, this paper explains
that Chile should make better use of UPOV ﬂexibilities and gives recommendations in order to accommodate the
interests of all stakeholders.
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Although the free trade agreement (FTA)1 with the United States requires Chile to ratify or accede to the
1991 act of the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV)2 before 1
January 2009, Chile continues to apply law nr. 19.342 on plant breeder’s rights (PBR) in conformity with
UPOV 1978. Despite attempts to abrogate this law and ratify the 1991 act of UPOV, law nr. 19.342 is still
in force. The ratiﬁcation process of UPOV 1991 in Chile started in 20093 and was accompanied by broad
social controversy because of its effects on Chile’s economic progress (Jefferson, 2014, p. 35). For this
reason, the Chilean President,Michelle Bachelet, withdraw the bill in 2014. Non-compliancewith the FTA
provisions on plant variety protection provides a basis for including Chile in the US Priority Watch List
(Ofﬁce of the United States Trade Representative, 2016, p. 49). As the US government may impose
unilateral trade sections or initiate dispute settlement proceedings at the world trade organization (WTO)
against countries included in the Watch List, it is important for Chile to design a plant variety protection
law in line with its commitments under the US FTA and at the same time responsive to its socio-economic
concerns.
This paper will offer guidance through an analysis of the legal controversy, interests of the parties
involved, the legal and economic aspects of the proposed plant variety law and an exploration of UPOV
1991 ﬂexibilities. To this purpose, the paper is organized as follows. Firstly, it brieﬂy introduces the reader
to the legal vicissitudes of the ratiﬁcation process, the decision of the Constitutional Court of Chile and the
interests of all the parties involved. Secondly, it compares the current plant variety protection law with
the UPOV 1991-compliant proposal in order to better understand the controversy. Thirdly, it broadens the
understanding of legal provisions through an economic perspective and empirical observations on plant
variety certiﬁcates in Chile. Fourthly, it seeks an appropriate legal framework for Chile by investigating
UPOV 1991 ﬂexibilities as well as the interaction between plant variety and patent rights. Finally, it
concludes and gives recommendations for a UPOV 1991-compliant law that promotes Chile’s interests in
plant breeding.
The Proposal to Adopt a UPOV 1991-Compliant Law
The process for adopting a national law in compliance with UPOV 1991 started on 3 March 2009 with the
proposal of the Chilean President Michelle Bachelet.4 The bill, named “Monsanto Law” by populist
movements (Jefferson, 2014, p. 39), encountered strong resistance from civil society. Farmers, various
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social groups and senators themselves denounced the negative effects of the proposed law on small-scale
farming, food sovereignty and biodiversity. These concerns were especially emphasized in a petition in
front of the Constitutional Tribunal of Chile. On 20May 2011, 17 senators claimed the unconstitutionality5
of UPOV 1991,6 but the Tribunal rejected their petition.7 The grounds for the petition and the reasons for
its rejection will be here brieﬂy illustrated in order to better understand the matter at hand. The main
arguments put forward by the senators were as follows:
1. The restriction of the farmers’ privilege violates the right of property as established in art. 19. N. 24 of
the Constitution.8
2. The provisions of UPOV violate the duty of the State to protect the preservation of the environment as
required by article 19 n. 8 of the Constitution and the scope of protection on plant varieties in UPOV
1991 obstacles the movement of goods.9
3. Violation of the State’s duty to promote the harmonious integration of all sectors of the country and
guarantee to the people the right to participate with equal opportunities in the national life as required by
article 1, last paragraph of the Constitution.
4. Violation of the right to equality before the law (stated in article 19. n. 2 and n. 22 of the Constitution)
considering that UPOV 1991 provides for no compensation for farmers that supply the genetic material
possessed by the right holder.
The Tribunal dismissed these arguments as follows:
1. The contested rules do not relate with the right to acquire a private good, but with the protection and
regulation of ownership. UPOV 1991 does not impede farmers to acquire ownership if their varieties
comply with its requirements.10 Although farmers’ varieties are not registered, they are
commercialized through local channels. This means that there is established knowledge on these
varieties and there is no need for registers.11
2. There is no direct relationship betweenUPOV and contamination of the environment12 andUPOVdoes
not regulate the commercialization of plant varieties. Article 18 of the 1991 act clariﬁes that the
breeder’s right shall be independent of any measure taken by a Contracting Party to regulate within its
territory the production, certiﬁcation andmarketing ofmaterial of varieties and that suchmeasures shall
not affect the application of its provisions.
3. The Tribunal decided that UPOV 1991 does not affect equality before the law. The formulation of the
petition was deemed too generic since it did not specify how the Constitutional provision was violated.
Thus it failed to provide the Tribunal the basis for a decision (p. 74). Similarly, the judges argued that
the petition lacked sufﬁcient elements to issue a verdict on a hypothetical violation of State’s rights on
the integration of the nation (p. 75).
The above arguments are undoubtedly thought-provoking but their analysis falls beyond the scope of
this paper. The decision of the Constitutional Tribunal is yet relevant for the matter at hand as it offers
important insights into the reasons for the controversy, and consequently helps ﬁnd a solution. The
decision reveals a clash between two major interests in plant breeding: those of commercial plant breeders
and those of smallholder farmers. Commercial plant breeders are public institutions or breeding
companies, which engage in creating new varieties of plants with enhanced qualities (to respond to
consumers’ preferences or climate conditions). Advanced biotechnological techniques and laboratory
research allow these varieties to express identical characteristics through generations and control quality
and yield performance. Smallholder farmers, on the other hand, often comprise indigenous people and
families, who have undertaken plant breeding activities since time immemorial. They, however, do not
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have the technical and ﬁnancial means to create the same varieties as commercial breeders. Farmers’
varieties are heterogeneous and express distinctive features when replanted (Prifti, 2015a, pp.13–4).
To put it brieﬂy, commercial breeders and farmers differ in two main aspects: ﬁnancial resources and
innovation models.13 These differences are reﬂected in the current controversy on plant variety protection
in Chile. As underlined in the decision of the Constitutional Tribunal, UPOV does not protect smallholder
farmers and indigenous people. These small innovators market their seeds through local and informal
channels. Although this might induce to think that there is no overlap between farmers’ and commercial
breeders’ system, the senators’ petition claimed that the restriction of the farmers’ privilege in UPOV 1991
creates difﬁculties for smallholders who cannot replant and exchange commercial seeds with each other.
Social concerns on the economic impact of UPOV 1991 on small-scale farming were also one reason for
the bill’s withdrawal on 17 March 2014 (Jefferson, 2014, pp. 38–43). In order to better understand the
matter and assess how UPOV protects these different interests, the following section will explain the
UPOV system and compare the Chilean plant variety protection law with the UPOV 1991 bill.14
A Legal Perspective
Assessing Plant Variety Protection: UPOV 1991 Versus UPOV 1978
UPOV aims at incentivizing breeders to create new varieties of plants through the grant of breeder’s rights.
Breeder’s rights are a kind of intellectual property right that enable breeders to “capture a larger portion of
the additional beneﬁts generated by the cultivation of a new variety” (Eaton, 2007). Along with
proﬁtmaking, the object and scope of protection as well as duration of rights are other determinants
designed to stimulate plant breeding activities. In this respect, the last UPOV amendment in 1991
introduces three main novelties: the obligation to protect all plant genera and species (article 3), a broader
scope of protection (articles 14 and 15), a greater period of protection (articles 13 and 19). Under the
precedent act, UPOV 1978, protection of all plant genera and species is only an option (article 4.1). The
1978 Act requires countries to protect a minimum of 24 genera and species, but at the same time it allows
them to reduce the number of protected genera and species based on their special economic and ecological
conditions. The lack of this ﬂexibility in UPOV 1991 may be one concern for Chile.
Another novelty and concern of UPOV 1991 regards the scope of protection. Article 14 of UPOV
1991 covers the scope of the rights granted to the plant breeder, while its article 15 delineates some limits to
the exercise of these rights. Based on article 14, breeder’s rights extend to the protected variety, its
essentially derived varieties (EDVs) as well as harvested material, and encompass additional acts such as
conditioning for the purpose of propagation, exportation, importation and stocking for such purposes
(article 15). UPOV 1978, on the other hand, provides that the rights of the breeder can be enforced only
with regard to the production for commercial purposes, offering for sale and marketing of propagating
material of the variety (article 5). It can be noticed from this brief comparison that UPOV 1991 grants a
broader scope of protection not only by extending rights on the object of protection (EDVs, harvested
material) but also by covering additional acts on protected material (exportation, importation and
stocking).
The broader scope of protection granted to the breeder is further apparent in the “breeder’s exception”
and “farmers’ privilege,” new provisions contained in article 15 of UPOV 1991. The breeder’s exception
allows other breeders to use the protected variety as a source of variation for breeding other varieties, while
the farmers’ privilege is usually intended to permit farmers to save and replant protected seeds, and
exchange them with other farmers. Breeders and farmers who commercialize protected products are
nevertheless required to ask for a licence from the original breeder. These practices were already
permissible under article 5 of UPOV 1978,15 but it was article 15 of UPOV 1991 that made explicit the
conditions under which breeder’s rights are not deemed to be infringed. Its paragraph 1 makes the
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breeder’s exception mandatory, whereas paragraph 2 gives countries the option to allow farmers using for
propagating purposes, on their own holdings, the product of the harvest which they have obtained by
planting, on their own holdings, a protected variety.16 The provision on farmers’ privilege undoubtedly
expands the scope of protection for breeders and reduces lawful activities for farmers. This restriction of
the freedom to save and exchange seeds is one of themain controversies provoked byUPOV1991 in Chile.
Article 13 of UPOV 1991 further strengthens breeder’s rights by granting protection during the period
between the ﬁling or the publication of the application for the grant of a breeder’s right and the grant of that
right UPOV (2009b). During this period, the breeder is entitled to receive an equitable remuneration for
acts that infringe his rights under article 14. As the period of provisional protection is added to the actual
years of protection, the consequence of this provision is the postponement of third parties’ market entry.
The provisional protection of rights may generate worries with regard to access of protected varieties and
may subsequently slow innovations in plant breeding. The same concerns exist on the length of protection;
UPOV 1991 shifted the minimum years of protection from 15 to 20, and for trees and vines, from 18 to
25.17 In order to understand how the transposition of UPOV 1991 provisions into national legal systems
may affect Chile, the following section will examine its legislative proposal for complying with UPOV
1991 in a comparative perspective with the current plant variety protection system based on UPOV 1978.
UPOV 1978 Versus UPOV 1991 in Chile
As aforementioned, Chile ratiﬁed UPOV 1978 with law no. 19.342. In order to better comprehend the
controversy, the following table compares the object of protection and the scope of breeder’s rights under
this law and the bill drafted in compliance with UPOV 1991.
Object of Protection
As shown in Table 1, both legal acts protect plant varieties of all genera and species. Law no. 19.342
extends the object of protection to propagating material, while bill no. 8570 to hybrids. The language of
their provisions differs; nevertheless, there are no substantial differences as regards the objection of
protection under these legal acts. Propagating material, for example, falls under the scope of plant
breeder’s rights in the proposed law (article 39). Similarly, the explicit mention of hybrid varieties in the
object of protection does not add much as hybrids are a type of plant variety bred through a hybridization
process.18
Scope of Protection
The novelties of UPOV 1991 come to light with respect to the scope of protection. Table 1 shows the
greater number of activities that fall under the scope of breeder’s rights. In some cases, these activities are
complementary to those already protected by law no. 19.342 (preparation of the material for propagation
purposes, its advertisement and stocking)19; in others, they include new acts (harvested material,20
essentially derived varieties21).
One of the new provisions appears problematic: “varieties that are not clearly distinguishable from the
protected variety” (article 39 c). The language of this provision suggests that breeder’s rights may cover
any variety, even those varieties developed independently from the protected variety. This seems to give
not only a broader, but also an unreasonable scope of protection to the breeder. If the reason for granting
breeder’s rights is that of allowing breeders to “capture a larger portion of the additional beneﬁts generated
by the cultivation of a new variety” (Eaton, 2007), rewarding the breeder for varieties created without his
contribution ﬁnds no justiﬁcation. Extending breeder’s rights to “not clearly distinguishable” varieties
may thus generate additional proﬁt for the breeder without a real contribution from his part. This will
incentivize proﬁt-making but not necessarily the creation of varieties with novel added value.
A further ill-advised effect of this provision may be that of extending breeder’s rights to varieties
which have been previously developed but not registered. It may happen that a breeder ameliorates an
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Table 1: Law No. 19.342 Versus Bill. No. 8570
Law no. 19.342 Bill no. 8570
Object of protection Article 3 Article 3
Plant variety and propagating material
of all genera and species.
Plant varieties and their hybrids of all genera
and species.
Scope of protection Article 3 Article 39
a) Production of propagating material
of the variety.
a) Preparation of the material for propagation
purposes.
b) Sale, offering for sale or display for
sale of the said material.
b) Production of propagating material of the
said variety.
c) Marketing, import or export thereof. c) Sale, offering for sale, advertisement or
display for sale of the said material.
d) Repeated use of the new variety for
the commercial production of
another variety.
d) Marketing, import or export thereof.
e) Use of ornamental plants or of parts
of such plants that are normally
marketed for purposes other than
propagation, with a view to the
production of ornamental plants or
cut flowers.
e) Repeated use of the new variety for the
commercial production of another variety.
f) Stocking for any of the purposes mentioned
above.
g) Use of ornamental plants or of parts of such
plants that are normally marketed for purposes
other than propagation, with a view to the
production of ornamental plants or cut flowers.
Article 39, part 2
a) The harvested material, including entire
plants and parts of plants, obtained without
authorization, unless the holder has had
reasonable opportunity to exercise his right
in relation to such material.
b) Varieties essentially derived from a
protected one, unless the protected variety is
an essentially derived variety itself.
c) Varieties that are not clearly distinguishable
from the protected variety, according to the
distinctiveness criterion established in





a) Acts done privately with no commercial
purposes.
continued
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existing variety and obtain protection even if the new variety is not clearly distinguishable. This can occur
when the original variety is not a matter of common knowledge23 and thus does not come into question
when assessing the “distinctiveness” requirement. This situation may create the paradox of allowing the
breeder to claim his rights on the variety which enabled him to undertake the breeding process.
Table 1: (Continued)
Law no. 19.342 Bill no. 8570
b) Acts done for experimental purposes.
Breeder’s exception Article 5 Article 49, c)
Create a new variety without having to
seek the authorization of the breeder
of the original variety that served as
the means for breeding the new one.
The authorization of the breeder is
required where the variety has to be
used continually for the production
of a new variety.
Acts done for the purpose of creating new
varieties and the acts listed in Article 39
unless they regard: essentially derived
varieties or varieties not clearly
distinguishable from the protected variety,
or varieties whose production requires the
repeated use of the protected variety.
Farmers’ exception Article 3, last paragraph Article 48
Use, on his own farm, of the harvest
from properly acquired reproductive
material. On no account, however,
may such material be advertised
or transferred by any legal title as
seed.
Use for propagating purposes of the harvest
obtained from the planting of a lawfully
acquired protected variety other than hybrid
or synthetic, on his own holdings. It is
expressly prohibited the sale or alienation
by any title of the propagative material.
This right can be exercised on the species
Solanum tuberosum L. (potato) and on
cereals; legumes and seed propagated
species determined by the regulation.
Compulsory licences Article 7 Article 45
If a breeder is in a situation of
monopolistic abuse in the
exploitation or marketing of the
protected variety.
a) If the breeder has engaged in conducts or
practices declared contrary to free
competition, in direct relation with the use
or exploitation of the variety in question,
according to final and executive decision of
the Tribunal of Defense of Free
Competition, in conformity with current
legislation.
b) When for reasons of public health, national
security, public noncommercial use or
national emergency, extreme urgency or
others that are of public interest, declared
by the competent authority, (. . .).
Note: The terms in italic indicate those provisions added by the bill. For the duration of breeder’s rights and their provisional
protection, the considerations elaborated above remain valid and are not shown in the table. The bold part of the provision indicates
the restriction of the farmers’ privilege.
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The Breeder’s Exception
Other novelties introduced by the bill regard the exceptions to breeder’s rights. Although the breeder’s
exception continues to allow other breeders to use the protected variety in their breeding lines, the bill
clariﬁes that EDVs or not clearly distinguishable varieties do not fall under the exception. This means
that the breeder should ask for a licence not only if he commercially produces varieties bred with the
protected variety, but also if he simply uses EDVs and not clearly distinguishable varieties in his
breeding programmes. Besides broadening the scope of breeder’s rights, envisaging acts on EDVs
and not clearly distinguishable varieties as infringing creates difﬁculties for compliance. This is because
it is not easy to determine what an EDVs is and when a variety is not clearly distinguishable from a
protected one (International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, 2013). Large plant
breeding companies may be well-equipped to conduct such an investigation, but small farmers and
indigenous communities clearly lack the necessary resources to determine when a variety is an EDV or
when it is not clearly distinguishable from a protected one. They might thus very often infringe PVP
provisions.
The Farmers’ Exemption
The current plant variety protection law does not make use of the seed-saving exemption of UPOV 1978.
The bill reafﬁrms the seed exchange prohibition and puts further limitations. Whereas it continues to
permit seed-saving from the product of the harvest on farmer’s own farm, it explicitly excludes saving of
hybrid and synthetic seeds.24 The right to save propagated material can be exercised on the species
Solanum tuberosum L. (potato) and on cereals; legumes and seed propagated species determined by the
regulation.25 Although the provision allows seed saving for potatoes, cereals, legumes and other seed-
propagates species, its applicability is more limited than it might appear. This is because many of the
marketed cereals and legumes are hybridized.26
The applicability of this provision would be further reduced if marketed varieties were genetically
modiﬁed. The consequence would be the impossibility to save seed. Although this is not the present
situation, it may be a possibility in the future.27 Hence this provision may be deemed too restrictive,
especially for those farmers who need to save seed for their subsistence. In this speciﬁc context, seed
exchange is a must in order to enhance farmers’ livelihoods and food security. In a more general context,
seed exchange would enable technology transfer and broaden the base of genetic variety for breeding new
plants. This is not permitted by the provision on farmers’ privilege in the revoked bill.
Besides restricting seed practices only to own harvest on own’s holdings,28 the provision allows sale
of farmers’ products to third parties for ﬁnal use or consumption.29 This interpretation of the farmers’
privilege seems to outlaw informal credit practices. In Latin America, farmers sell their harvest to grain
dealers who provide it as a credit in kind to other farmers. These farmers use the credit as seed and pay off
with the double quantity of the seeds obtained (van Wijk, 1996).30 Under the farmers’ privilege, informal
credit might become illegal. This is because the sale of harvest to grain dealers is not intended either for
ﬁnal use or consumption. Similarly, the payoff of the credit in kind would not fall under the exemption.
Compulsory Licensing
Another restriction of breeders’ rights is found in the provision on compulsory licensing. While law no.
19.342 provides for compulsory licences only in case of monopolistic abuse in the exploitation or
marketing of the protected variety, the abrogated bill lists two grounds for compulsory licensing: a)
conducts or practices declared contrary to free competition, in direct relation with the use or exploitation of
the variety in question and b) reasons of public health, national security, public noncommercial use or
national emergency, extreme urgency or others that are of public interest, declared by the competent
authority.
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The reference to “public interest” broadens the grounds for compulsory licensing. “Public interest” is
an all-inclusive concept that gives the competent authority extensive freedom to determine the reasons for
compulsory licensing. In the case of uncompetitive behaviour or practices, the interpretation of the terms
“in direct relation with the use or exploitation of the variety in question” is decisive. “Direct” acts are those
acts that “bear immediately and unambiguously upon the facts at issue”31 and are connected to the variety
in a clear way.32 Conversely, indirect acts are those acts not directly aimed at the variety. Direct acts can
occur, for instance, when breeders agree to divide territories and reduce competition in these territories or
when they require exclusive dealing with distributors by contract.
The effect of these acts can be directly related to the variety as they immediately bear upon the
distribution of the variety. But it is not always easy to distinguish between direct and indirect acts on the
variety. An example can be the practice of tying the purchase of fertilisers with protected seeds. This
practice may be seen as indirectly related to the sale of fertilisers if seed of a substitutable variety is
available on the market. If, on the other hand, the protected seed is a unique product required for its
particular traits (draught tolerance, resistance to a speciﬁc disease), tying should be considered as directly
related to the variety. Both these acts can equally result in the restriction of free competition. Thus it does
not seem appropriate to base compulsory licensing only on acts in direct relation with the variety.
Another case of indirect acts that affect free competition may be that of a plant breeding company
purchasing another competitor with the intention of acquiring possession of one of its breeding lines. Since
control of breeding lines may be an indirect consequence of the takeover, it may be difﬁcult to relate the
purchase of the company with the intention to acquire a speciﬁc variety. For this reason, it is not clear why
the legislator does not take account of indirect acts as a basis for compulsory licensing.
Exhaustion of Rights
Besides the above articles, the bill contains a new provision on the exhaustion of breeder’s rights in its
article 50. The ﬁrst part of this article establishes that rights on plant material, harvestedmaterial, including
whole or parts of plants are extinguishedwith the sale of the protected variety by the right holder or with his
consent, while the second part exempts from this rule acts that involve further propagation of the variety in
question as well as activities relating to the export of material of the variety, which enable the propagation
of the variety in a country where there is no protection of the plant variety in question, except if the variety
is intended for consumption.
The ﬁrst part of this provision reﬂects article 16 of UPOV 1991. Its rationale could be explained by a
recent US Supreme Court decision on the exhaustion of patent rights related to biological material.33
Unlike other intellectual property rights, which exhaust with the ﬁrst sale of the protected product or
process by the IP owner or with his consent, the US judges clariﬁed that the exhaustion doctrine as applied
to protected biological material does not permit a farmer to reproduce patented seeds through planting and
harvesting without the patent holder’s permission.34 Similarly, it can be argued that breeder’s rights do not
permit farmers to reproduce protected seeds through planting and harvesting without the breeder’s
permission. Though this may be advisable from a right holder’s perspective, its effect on innovation is
questionable. Farmers that need to use protected seeds would need to ask for a licence. Not all of them can
be successful because licensing usually comes with high royalties and transaction costs. If licensing fails,
creation of new varieties and the transfer of the technology embedded in the protected biological material
will be impeded.
The restrictive effects of this provision for innovation become more apparent in its second part. There
is no good reason to prohibit the exportation of propagating material in a country where there is no plant
variety protection. If the rationale of plant breeder’s rights is that of rewarding breeders for improving
plant varieties, the reward can be obtained from selling and licensing their varieties in the country where
rights are granted. In a country with no PVP protection, breeders can sell their varieties but cannot exercise
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other PVP-related acts such as licensing and prohibition of seed-saving practices. It could be argued that
the breeder may nevertheless be disincentivized to market his varieties in a country where other breeders
could freely reproduce the original variety and offer it at lower prices.35
This may be especially the case of varieties bred to resist climate conditions speciﬁc to the country.
Here the question would be whether the lead time enables the original breeder to recoup his R&B costs.
The answer will depend on the type of variety and the technical capacities of other breeders. In developing
and least developed countries, it may not be easy for domestic breeders to reproduce the original variety.
Even if they had the capacities, technical constrains do not allow reproduction of the variety. In the case of
hybrids, for example, ﬁnding parental lines requires advanced technological methods and considerable
time. The reproduction of GM varieties can only be performed by specialized companies in the sector. If
such companies are not in the market, the proﬁts of the original breeder may be curtailed only by seed-
saving.
It is, however, not easy to conclude a direct correlation between proﬁt curtailment and disincentive to
invest.36 Moreover, farmers are unable to produce for large markets and their varieties are of lower quality
than those of the original breeder. Thus, a clear answer cannot be provided. In any case, it appears
unfounded to prohibit exportation to countries with no PVP, especially when the activities of foreign
breeders do not enter into competition with that of the original one (when the 2nd breeder improves the
variety in order to develop a different one).37 From a consumer’s perspective, the provision may,
nevertheless, have some positive outcomes because it allows for exportation of propagating material
intended for consumption. As the provision does not clarify whether “consumption” is intended for
humans or animals, it can be argued that propagating material intended both for feed and food use is
authorized.
Offenses and Sanctions
A last aspect to be mentioned in a comparison between law no. 19.342 and the bill are their provisions on
offenses and sanctions.38 Articles 44–46 of law no. 19.342 lay down penal, civil and administrative
sanctions for acts that infringe the rights of the breeder. Penal sanctions in the context of plant breeding can
be disproportionate. They can put an unjustiﬁable burden on farmers who have traditionally engaged in
seed saving practices. As farming practices are embedded in the traditions and culture of a country
(Louwaars, 2007), an immediate change is difﬁcult. Traditional agricultural practices are handed down
from generation to generation and have become institutionalized in the society.39 A change in their
behavioural patterns is possible but it requires time.40 Moreover, farmers are often uninformed on legal
changes and thereby, unaware of IP rights on seeds or prohibitions of practices that they consider
“normal.” These are some of the difﬁculties that farmers would face under this law.
Interestingly, articles 51–56 of the revoked bill contained only civil sanctions41 but they add new
prohibitions such as the use of a different denomination for the protected variety; omission of the
denomination of the variety that corresponds to propagating material and labelling, classiﬁcation and
indication of consumer products as seeds and/ or of seeds as consumer products when they are not (article
51). This provision seems too demanding for farmers as they are not always aware of the denomination of
the variety or they may have their own informal denomination system. Imposing formal names may go
against their traditional cultural expressions.42
The analysis conducted so far denotes that the bill expands the rights of breeders and at the same time
highly restricts permissible activities for farmers. Though to a lesser extent, the same trend is noticed in law
no. 19.342 which does not make use of the ﬂexibilities of UPOV 1978. It appears thus that the current plant
variety protection law in Chile has already adopted UPOV 1991 provisions on the protection of all genera
and species as well as on farmers’ privilege. In order to take account of farmers’ concerns on strong
breeder’s rights, it is important to understand whether breeder’s rights can be weakened.
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Can Plant Breeders Rights Be Weakened?
Limits to plant breeder’s rights are contained in the UPOV Convention itself. As explained above,
breeder’s rights do not extend to private and non-commercial use, experimental and breeding activities,
and to some farming practices. Hence the answer to this question is positive. The issue is whether these
limits have a rationale. The justiﬁcation for limits to PBRs can be found in economic studies. Neoclassical
economic theory claims that strong proprietary rights lead to more innovation and societal welfare in the
long term. Although this theory has been recently debated (Andersen and Konzelmann, 2008, pp. 12–28;
Boldrin and Levine, 2008; Cimoli et al., 2014; Greenspoon and Cottle, 2011). Provisions on intellectual
property rights continue to be based on the neoclassical view. This view, also shared by the plant breeding
community (American Seed Trade Association, European Seed Association, International Seed
Federation)43 hinges on the necessity to grant intellectual protection as an incentive for innovation.
Its theoretical and empirical investigation in plant breeding has been object of fewer studies compared
to analysis in other technological areas. The reason lies in the inherent characteristics of plant varieties,
which make it very difﬁcult to provide general results for the whole sector. Depending on individual
variety features such as the type of pollination or yield, the results may vary from variety to variety. The
decision to invest in particular crops may additionally be an outcome of market demands or other
incentives (e.g. subsidies). Present studies have been mainly conducted on the most important
commercialized crops such as soybean, maize, rice, cotton, etc. and have investigated the effect of PBRs
on R&D, the number of the varieties released, market concentration, research priorities and access to
varieties. Their results have, however, been mixed (Goldsmith et al., 2007, p. 19; Endres and Gifﬁn, 2012,
pp. 203–53; Rangnekar, 2001).
The heterogeneity of the results is comprehensible given the divergence between the socio-economic
conditions of different countries and the diverse variables used in these studies. To put it simple, current
investigations do not allow drawing clear-cut conclusions on a direct link between PBRs and incentives to
innovate. They do, however, show that PBRs allow breeders to generate proﬁt and better appropriate their
R&B costs. The positive link between PBRs and proﬁt has been shown in one empirical study in Argentina,
Brazil, China, India and the United States. This study found a statistically signiﬁcant correlation between
R&D and hectares planted, but not crop yield (Endres and Gifﬁn, 2012, pp. 209–10). Breeders have more
gains by selling seed for each planted hectare as compared with crop yields. Crop yields, on the other hand,
beneﬁt more farmers. An earlier study provided similar arguments for Chile (Jaffe and van Wijk, 1995).
The grant and enforcement of plant breeder’s rights enabled private ﬁrms to obtain a better return on R&B
but no convincing evidence was found between IP rights and the rate of innovation.
This situation points to the importance of other factors in the development of plant breeding44 and
allows inferring that weaker rights for plant breeders may reduce proﬁt-making but not necessarily the
incentive to innovate.45 As the object of PBRs is not proﬁt-making but that of stimulating plant breeding
activities, weaker rights may be justiﬁed when countervailed against other deserving interests. Some
European countries, for example, have impaired patent rights for biotechnological innovations to favor
plant breeding activities despite the role of patents in biotech innovations (Prifti, 2015b). The scope of
rights is determinant in preserving innovation in the sector. In this regard, a theoretical model developed
for plant breeding suggests that exemptions to rights on plant varieties are desirable when R&D
expenditures are high (Moschini and Yerokhin, 2007, pp. 190–203). This may indicate the undesirability
of weaker rights on plant varieties as breeding costs are quite high. But this model does not take account of
social welfare effects. If the model added societal implications to the private incentive effects, the results
might differ. Thus, the question of deﬁning the scope of weaker rights in plant breeding remains open.
One study on the soybean industry has, however, shown that the farmers’ privilege does not decrease
the incentive to invest and there is no need for stronger property rights (Hansen and Knudson, 1996,
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pp. 403–14). The ﬁndings of this study can be further understood in a broader context. As mentioned
above, limited patent rights that beneﬁt breeding activities have already been accepted by the European
legislator as an incentive to innovate and increase innovation in plant breeding activities despite their
commercial intent. Hence it appears incongruous to believe that limiting plant breeder’s rights to permit
seed-saving and exchange would affect the incentive to invest in new varieties. Smallholder farmers and
indigenous communities do not engage in commercial activities but in subsistence farming to provide for
the needs of their families and eventually, the village. This implies that their varieties do not reach
commercial markets and consequently, do not enter into competition with plant breeders. Weakening
breeder’s rights can also bring beneﬁts to the breeders themselves as traditional farming practices enhance
biodiversity and offer a wider range of plant genetic material for commercial breeding (Correa, 2000b,
pp. 10–1; GIZDeutscheGesellschaft f€ur Internationale Zusammenarbeit GMbH, 2015, p. 27; de Jonge and
Munyi, 2015, p. 12). Allowing these activities in Chile would be especially important for its economic
growth. An investigation of the Chilean plant breedingmarket might offer other elements in support of this
reasoning.
A Chilean Perspective on Plant Variety Protection
Asmentioned above, Chile has provided for plant variety rights driven by the need to stimulate innovation
in plant breeding. The US–Chile FTA objective, stated in its preamble, to promote social welfare and
sustainable development seems to be another reason for fulﬁlling the obligation to ratify UPOV 1991. The
potential of free trade to maximize national welfare justiﬁes this aim (Chipman, 2008; Irwin, 2005, pp. 25–
52; Krugman, 1996; Ricardo, 1971; Trebilcock, 2011, pp. 4–10). The Heckscher–Ohlin model suggests
that trade particularly increases welfare in countries with different factors of production and technology
(Feenstra, 2004, pp. 31–63).46 The beneﬁts that FTAs bring to developing economies are, nevertheless, not
clear. One reason is the difﬁculty to deﬁne the effect of IP trade-related provisions on innovation, foreign
direct investment and technology transfer (Correa, 2000a, pp. 23–48). A multitude of factors inﬂuence the
effect of IP provisions and moreover, the effects vary according to the technological sector (Fink and
Primo Braga, 2005, pp. 19–40). Despite this ambiguousness, Chile has agreed to provide for plant variety
rights under the US FTA.
The question thus is not whether to adopt UPOV 1991 provisions but how to adapt them to the Chilean
socio-economic conditions. It was previously explained that strong plant breeder’s rights negatively affect
farmers’ freedom to perform their daily activities. This is the main concern of the heated controversy on
plant variety protection. As there seems to be a tendency towards stronger IP rights on international level,
lowering the threshold of protection of IP rights incorporated in a FTA requires a sound justiﬁcation both
from an IP and trade perspective.
Weak IP rights involve a trade-off between dynamic and static efﬁciency. When rights are weakened,
they allow third parties to beneﬁt from accessing new knowledge and products that would otherwise be
excluded from the public domain. This creates a static efﬁciency. Neoclassical economic theory, however,
suggests that this situation may give rise to dynamic inefﬁciency in the future as weaker rights may give
breeders no incentive to innovate. A solution to this dilemma is of fundamental importance for developing
countries in order to achieve economic growth and reduce the knowledge gap that divides them from
developed countries (Dosi and Stiglitz, 2014, p. 1). Besides access to knowledge, several other factors such
as missing or weak infrastructure, poorly functioning agricultural markets and a lack of investment hinder
economic growth in developing countries (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2014).
Trade is believed to be a remedy to these deﬁciencies by promoting a more efﬁcient allocation of
resources, transfer of knowledge, technological progress as well as domestic and international competition
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Krugman, 1979, pp. 253–66). More importantly, trade facilitates
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economic development.47 Trade is a means to improve economic growth, and thus human welfare, not an
end in itself (Horlick, 2011, p. 395). It should be noted that economic growth allows for distributional
effects which may be desirable or not for society. If undesirable, the development gap within the country
and between countries will deepen. Therefore, it seems advisable to view trade “as one of several
mechanisms to balance various social welfare objectives, including but not limited to innovation” (Chon,
2014, pp. 256–86; Sen, 1999). As clariﬁed above, empirical investigations on the effect of trade-related IP
rights on innovation are heterogeneous or absent in many sectors. Therefore, it is not possible to derive
conclusions on how UPOV 1991 provisions will affect the plant breeding sector in Chile.
We can, however, obtain some indications on the impact of plant breeder’s rights in the development
of the seed market by observing the grant of plant variety certiﬁcates in Chile. The following diagrams
show thus the share of proprietary market in different seed sectors.48
In Figures 1–4, we can notice that several countries hold plant breeder’s rights. Foreign breeders
appear to have a larger market share than Chilean breeders. In the tree sector, Chilean breeders are not
active. Chile has the largest share for agricultural crops but a minor one for other sectors dominated by the
Figure 2. Share of proprietary market for fruits
Figure 1. Share of proprietary market for ornamentals
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United States and the Netherlands. Table 2 shows the number of PVP certiﬁcates held by breeding
companies in Chile in 2015. Of the 53 PVP certiﬁcates granted to Chilean breeders, 26 belong to public
institutions and 27 to private ﬁrms.49 Chilean breeders engage in creating crops that are native to the
country50 or form a substantial part of the Chilean diet such as avena, barley, beans, lupus, maize, oregano,
potatoes, red clover, triticale and wheat (Umaña-Murray, 1996).51
Potato breeding is carried out by public breeders who are also active in wheat breeding. Twelve PVP
certiﬁcates in wheat varieties are awarded to public companies while 11 certiﬁcates to Erik von Baer, the
only private breeder of wheat in Chile. Although it is not wise to draw general conclusions, this situation
gives rise to two considerations in terms of the issue at hand. The ﬁrst pertains to the economic theory on
the incentive to invest as a means of spurring innovation. This theory does not hold when publicly funded
ﬁrms undertake breeding activities. This is because investment in variety improvement of important staple
crops, such as the potato in Chile, is an objective of national agricultural programmes and funds will be
dedicated independently of market incentives. Absence of market incentives, indeed, may be necessary for
Figure 3. Share of proprietary market for agricultural crops
Figure 4. Share of proprietary market for trees
Note: The data were last updated on 13 July 2015 and the ﬁgures do not distinguish between provisional and deﬁnitive titles.
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public intervention in order to ensure diffusion and access to essential crops. Market incentives are high
when crop commercialization brings proﬁt. Besides wheat, maize is another crop where private incentives
to invest are strong.
Similarly to wheat, PVP certiﬁcates for maize are also granted to only one company, Agricola Panam
Seed Service. This allows us to arrive at the second remark, which relates to the privileged position of seed
companies. If there is only one company active in improving varieties of a species, it means that one sole
breeder will determine seed prices and distribution. The time lead and the market advantage may allow the
ﬁrst breeder to recoup his breeding and development (B&D) costs. There is no reason, thus, to object to a
farmers’ privilege that would allow farmers to carry out their normal farming activities such as seed saving
and exchange. Table 2 provides a better understanding of the position of breeders in Chile by showing
ownership of agricultural crops.
Table 2: No. of Protected Agricultural Crops in Chile
Species No. of protected varieties Company
1. Artichoke 6 Nunhems B.V.
1 Baroda Farms, Inc.
2. Lupinus luteus 1 Centro de Genomica Nutricional Agroacuicola, CGNA
3.Lupinus
angustifolius
1 Western Australian Agriculture Authority,
Grain Research and Development Corporation
1 Erik von Baer
4. Lupinus albus L. 1 Erik von Baer
1 INIA Chile
5. Rice 1 Instituto de Investigaciones Agropecuarias
6. Pea 3 Seminis Vegetable Seeds, Inc.
7. Avena 2 Erik von Baer
1 Noordsaat Saatzucht GmbH
1 The New Zealand Institute For Plant and Food Research
Limited
8. Avena negra 1 Panam France
9. Hybrid ryegrass 1 PGG Wrightson Seeds Ltd.
10. English
ryegrass
2 PGG Wrightson Seeds Ltd.
1 R.A.G.T.
11. Italian ryegrass 2 PGG Wrightson Seeds Ltd.
12. Bromus 2 Instituto de Investigaciones Agropecuarias
13. Barley 1 Nordsaat Saatzucht GmbH
1 Erik von Baer
1 Secobra Recherche S.A.S
14. Onions 4 Seminis Vegetable Seeds, Inc.
1 Instituto de Investigaciones Agropecuarias
15. Cilantro 1 Seminis Vegetable Seeds, Inc.
16. Colza (rapseed
oil)
1 Monsanto Technology LLC
17. Beans 4 Seminis Vegetable Seeds, Inc.
2 Alliance Semillas S.A.
1 Harris Moran Seed Company
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Table 2: (Continued)
Species No. of protected varieties Company
18. Lactuca sativa 3 Seminis Vegetable Seeds, Inc.
19. Maize 7 Agricola Panam Seed Service
20. Melon 4 Seminis Vegetable Seeds, Inc.
7 Nunhems B.V.
21. Oregan 1 Fundacion Chile
22. Potato 3 Instituto de Investigaciones Agropecuarias
6 HZPC Holland B.V.
2 Kweekbedrijf Ropta ZPC
2 KWS Potato B.V.
1 INIA Chile
2 Frito-Lay, Inc.
1 IPM Potato Group Ltd.
1 Saka Pflanzenzucht GmbH Co. & KG
(Solana Resaerch GmbH)
1 Agrico B.A.
1 Europlant Pflanzanzucht GmbH
2 Solana Agrar Produkte GmbH and Go. Kg
1 Germicopa SAS
23. Orchard grass 1 R.A.G.T
24. Cucumber 1 Seminis Vegetable Seeds, Inc.
25. Quinoa 1 Erik von Baer
26. Raps/Colza 1 Forage Innovations Ltd.
27. Watermelon 1 Nunhems B.V.
28. Tomato 2 Nunhems B.V.
2 Seminis Vegetable Seeds, Inc.
29. White clover 1 Pyne Gould Guiness Ltda.
30. Red clover 1 Criadero El Cencerro S.A.
1 Semillas Biscayart SA
1 Instituto de Investigaciones Agropecuarias
1 ANASAC
31. Sub clover 2 South Australian Seed Growers
32. Wheat 10 Erik von Baer
9 Instituto de Investigaciones Agropecuarias
1 Nordsaat Saatzucht GmbH
1 ANASAC
2 Saaten Union Recherche S.A.S
1 Swl€o Weibull Sarl
1 W. von Borries-Eckendorf GmbH & Co. KG
33. Durum wheat 3 Instituto de Investigaciones Agropecuarias
34. Triticale 1 Instituto de Investigaciones Agropecuarias
1 INIA
35. Carrot 2 Nunhems B.V.
Note: Data updated as of July 2015 on the website of Servicio Agrıcola y Ganadero, Chile.
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Despite some diversity in ownership of potato and wheat breeding, most of the protected varieties
belong to one or two companies. The above table also shows that PVP certiﬁcates are granted only for
35 crops. Considering that the number of agricultural species, both domesticated and wild is higher,52 it
may be argued that farmers are free to cultivate other species. Although this may be true,53 most important
Chilean crops such as wheat and potato are protected with plant variety certiﬁcates.
Concentration of staple crops in the hands of few breeders enables them to easily charge monopolistic
prices and prevent subsistence farmers to cultivate varieties for family use. When prevented to save,
replant and exchange seed, farmers face additional costs, such as the cost of storage and acquiring new seed
(Ragavan, 2012, pp. 317–19). These difﬁculties combined with lack of sufﬁcient ﬁnancial resources might
lead to food security problems, especially in marginalized areas and amongst indigenous population. At
present, 5% of the Chilean population is undernourished.54 This seems a good reason to limit breeder’s
rights for the beneﬁt of marginalized communities who have poor access to food. The importance of food
security in limiting rights in plant breeding has already been argued in relation to patent rights (Prifti,
2015b, pp. 163–5).55 Whilst breeder’s rights pose less food security concerns than patent rights in plant
breeding,56 protected seeds may nevertheless impede smallholder farmers and indigenous peoples to
achieve food security.
It is worth noting though that IP rights are only a small component of the institutional framework
required to deal with the issue of food security.57 But IP policies may play a role in ensuring food security
when they impede or facilitate creation of new varieties (Blakeney, 2009, pp. 234–44). It becomes thus
imperative for Chile to shape its IP trade-related policy in order to promote access to food. Furthermore,
the relevance of food security in the implementation of the right to food (Chiarolla, 2015, pp. 521–43;
Haugen, 2005, pp. 342–51) requires human rights to prevail when hampered by private rights (GIZ
Deutsche Gesellschaft f€ur Internationale Zusammenarbeit GMbH, 2015).
Subsidies
In the agricultural sector, subsidies also play a role in agricultural innovation. It has been argued that PBRs
do not reduce trade barriers when countries incentivize crop production through subsidies (Ragavan, 2007,
p. 320, pp. 335–40).58 This seems to be also the case of PBRs in Chile, which may create more beneﬁts for
US breeders rather than local ones. As noticed in the above diagrams, US breeders have large portions of
the Chilean market.
Besides PV certiﬁcates, US breeders receive generous subsidies from the US government
(Edwards, 2009).59 US subsidies are higher than those received by Chilean farmers (Babcock, 2006, p. 3),
which ﬁnd themselves in a disadvantaged position because US breeders may be able to sell their
varieties at lower prices. This will increase marginalization of smallholder farmers and indigenous
peoples given their difﬁculty to compete in the market. The effect might be that of hindering productivity
growth in lagging regions instead of promoting it. But the revitalization of the agricultural sector in a
modernizing economy such as Chile requires an emphasis on productivity, commercialization and
competiveness of traditional crops systems (Pingali, 2010, pp. 3867–79). To support this objective, the
Chilean legislator should use PBRs as a development tool for all the stakeholders involved.60 A broad
farmers’ privilege seems to be an adequate instrument to mitigate the monopolistic effects of breeder’s
rights on smallholders and indigenous peoples, and at the same time preserve breeder’s incentive to
innovate.
For all of the above reasons, it does not appear wise to impose western standards of plant variety
protection in Chile. The incentives for Western PVP are different from those of developing countries
where indigenous culture and smallholder farmers require special protection.61What works for developed
countries, may reveal ineffective for the developing ones.62 History has indeed shown that countries adopt
stronger IPRs as they develop from lower to higher income countries (Freeman 1995; Mercurio, 2011,
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pp. 49–50).63 At this point, the issue to be considered is whether UPOV1991 allows for ﬂexibilities to limit
breeder’s rights and introduce a broad farmers’ privilege.
Finding the Flexibilities in UPOV 1991
Although UPOV 1991 provides for strong rights, it contains some exemptions such as the breeder’s,
experimental, the private and non-commercial exemption and the farmers’ privilege. Whilst the farmers’
privilege is an optional exemption, the others are mandatory.
With respect to the mandatory exemptions, authors (de Jonge and Munyi, 2015, pp. 13–5; Prifti,
2015b, p. 19) argue that smallholders’ activities of saving, replanting and exchanging seeds fall under the
private and non-commercial exemption. Subsistence and indigenous peoples, indeed, carry out seed-
saving practices to satisfy basic family needs and have thus no commercial intent.
UPOV FAQ further clarifys that subsistence farming acts done “exclusively for the production of a
food crop to be consumed by that farmer and the dependents of the farmer” are deemed to fall within the
private and non-commercial acts.64 In addition, the FAQ permit subsistence farmers to exchange their
seeds against other vital goods within the local community, where the legitimate interests of the breeders
are not signiﬁcantly affected. This clariﬁcation gives reason for two considerations. The ﬁrst pertains to
prohibition of seed sale, whereas the second relates to the “legitimate interests of the breeder.” Seed
exchange with vital goods precludes the possibility to sell seed. This means that farmers cannot obtain
credit in kind as explained above whilst analyzing the UPOV 1991 bill.
With respect to the “legitimate interests of the breeder,” UPOV notes suggest considering a
combination of several factors whilst deﬁning these terms in its explanatory notes on exceptions to the
breeder’s rights, such as the type of variety to be exempted; the size of the holding, crop area or crop value;
proportion or amount of harvested crop; remuneration and changing situations. Although Prifti (2015a, pp.
21–2) elaborates on these terms in the context of the farmers’ privilege (UPOV 2009a), it does not appear
sensible to subject the private and non-commercial use exemption to the “legitimate interests of the
breeder.” In the case of smallholders and indigenous peoples, the importance of seed exchange with vital
goods should prevail over the economic interests of the breeder.Moreover, the purpose of the exemption to
allow private and non-commercial activities excludes an interest from the breeder. If smallholders engage
in commercial activities, they will be considered as competitors and might fall under the breeder’s
exemption.
UPOV notes also consider traditional practices of seed-saving as part of the farmers’ privilege. In this
regard, some authors have already put forward a broad understanding of the farmers’ privilege that
includes seed-exchange (Prifti, 2015b, pp. 20–2) and have differentiated between different types of
farmers in order to take account of their different incentives (de Jonge and Munyi, 2015). It appears thus
that the mandatory exemption of private and non-commercial use is best suited to protect the interests of
smallholder farmers and indigenous people.
UPOV Flexibilities and Patents
Despite the explicit prohibition to grant patents on plant varieties (article 37 (b) of law no. 19.039 on
Industrial Property), patent rights extend to plant varieties when patented elements are inserted into
a variety since patent rights have no exceptions. This means that if the Chilean legislator decides
to broaden the farmer’s privilege to breeder’s rights, farmers’ freedom to use, resow and exchange seed
will be restricted if patents cover plant varieties. Besides farmers, patent rights also impede breeders to
freely use patented varieties in their breeding programs. Hence, a coherent implementation of plant
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breeder’s rights in Chile requires an introduction of a farmers’ privilege and a breeder’s exemption to
patent rights.
Conclusions and Recommendations
This paper argues that UPOV standards imposed by US FTAs in Chile may not work as an incentive to
foster domestic plant breeding. Although strong rights help breeders to recoup their B&D costs and
increase proﬁts, they prevent farmers and indigenous peoples from accessing the technology embedded in
the protected seed as well as from continuing their traditional breeding practices. Preserving these
practices and balancing all the concerned stakeholders is necessary for designing policies that encourage
sustainable development in Chile. The analysis allows concluding that it is not free trade that should
be questioned, but the drafting of plant variety law in line with the national development needs. Hence the
following recommendations for adopting UPOV 1991-compliant plant breeder’s rights in Chile:
1. Subsistence farmers and all indigenous communities should be allowed to continue their traditional
practices of saving, replanting, and exchanging seed for any kind of plant variety under the private and
non-commercial exemption.
2. The farmers’ privilege should be adopted and the legislator may differentiate between different types of
farmers when deciding on the amount of seed to be used on farmer’s own holding.
3. Seed saving should be allowed for staple crops relevant for food security independently from the
breeding method (synthetic or hybrid).
4. The exhaustion of breeder’s rights should end with the ﬁrst sale. The further propagation of protected
material should be freely permitted.
5. There should be no distinction between direct and indirect anticompetitive acts when deciding on
compulsory licensing.
6. There should be no penal sanctions for farmers.
7. When granting patent rights on plants, Chile should explicitly adopt a breeder’s and a farmers’
exemption to patent rights.
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on Acts in Respect of Harvested Material Under the 1991 Act of the UPOV Convention, October 24, 2013,
UPOV/EXN/HRV/1. Available at <http://www.upov.int/edocs/expndocs/en/upov_exn_hrv.pdf> [Accessed
June 2015].
21. For an explanation see article 2, g) of the bill. For a thorough understanding see UPOV Seminar on Essentially
Derived Varieties, October 22, 2013 (Geneva, Switzerland). Available at <http://www.upov.int/edocs/pubdocs/
en/upov_pub_358.pdf> [Accessed June 2015].
22. “The variety is distinct if it is clearly distinguishable by the expression of one or more important characteristics
from any other variety whose existence at the date of ﬁling the application, is well known. A well-known variety,
inter alia, is the one that appears on the ofﬁcial lists of varieties of any country or that whose registration has been
requested in any of them.”
23. Although article 7 of the bill does not exclude that varieties not listed in ofﬁcial registers may be deemed as a
“matter of common knowledge,” the interpretation of “common knowledge” will be decisive in determining the
“distinctiveness” requirement.
24. Although the act does not deﬁne “synthetic” seeds, conventional wisdom suggests that the terms refer to
genetically modiﬁed seeds.
25. To author’s knowledge, the regulation has not been enacted given the withdrawal of the bill. See article 56 of the
bill establishing that the Regulation should be emanated within 180 days after the promulgation of the bill (law) in
the Ofﬁcial Gazette.
26. For an understanding of hybridized varieties, see DuPont Pioneer’s list of hybridized products. Available at
<https://www.pioneer.com/home/site/about/products/crops/canola/> [Accessed June 2015]. To be noticed that
its canola and maize hybrids are already marketed in Chile.
27. Geneticallymodiﬁed crops are not allowed for domestic consumption in Chile, but they have been cultivated since
1987 and authorized for export in 1992. The main GM crops are maize, soybeans and canola. See Salazar and
Montenegro (2009) pp. 353–68. See also USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, Gain Report nr. CI1021, 15
July 2011. For more information on the approved GM crops in Chile, see the GM Approval Database. Available
at <http://www.isaaa.org/gmapprovaldatabase/approvedeventsin/default.asp?CountryID=CL&Country=Chile>
[Accessed July 2015].
28. From the wording of the provision, it may be questionable whether the farmer should be the sole proprietor of the
holding or bear any kind of property title.
29. The farmer is, however, not allowed to save a larger quantity of seed than that originally acquired. For further
explanations on this point see the decision of the Tribunal Constitucional of Chile, 24 June 2011, Rol No. 1988-11,
pp. 62–3.
30. See Jeroen van Wijk, “How Does Stronger Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Affect Seed Supply? Early
Evidence of Impact” (1996) 13Natural Resource Perspectives. Formore on informal credit markets in the Chilean
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agricultural sector, see Nisbet (1969), “The Relationship Between Institutional and Informal Credit Markets in
Rural Chile” (1969) 45(2). Land Economics.
31. For a deﬁnition of “direct” see, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/deﬁnition/english/direct> [Accessed
June 2015].
32. For a deﬁnition of “direct” see <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/direct> [Accessed July 2015].
33. Bowman vs. Monsanto Co, No. 11-796, 569US_(2013). For more on this issue, see Lim (2015), p. 559, pp. 563–9.
34. For other US cases on this issue see Janis (2014), pp. 238–40.
35. An example is a strawberry variety developed by University of California Davis not allowed to be licenced,
marketed, or produced in countries with no UPOV protection. See Jefferson et al. (2014), p. 400.
36. For further discussion, see the section “Can Plant Breeder’s Rights Be Weakened?”.
37. Here an issue may be that of deﬁning differences between varieties. In this regard, it has been argued that
essentially derived varieties do not enter into direct competition with the original variety. See Prifti (2015b),
p. 116.
38. For a more elaborated analysis on penal sanctions see (Prifti, 2015b).
39. For an understanding of this phenomenon in a general context, see Berger and Luckmann (1991), pp. 70–89.
40. For an explanation of social change see Moore (1974). The change for farmers can be caused both by
technological (GM seeds) and economic (change of breeding processes) factors.
41. Although article 52 does not preclude the possibility of applying penal sanctions.
42. Names are included in the traditional cultural expressions. For general information, see<http://www.wipo.int/tk/
en/folklore/> [Accessed July 2015].
43. See the positions papers of the American Seed Trade Association, European Seed Association, International Seed
Federation. For an historical overview of the origin of PBRs, see Kevles (2002).
44. Countries’macroeconomic policiesmay play amajor role. This was observedwith regard toArgentina in the Jaffe
and vanWijk study. For an understanding of a variety of factors that inﬂuence innovation in general see Freeman
(1995), pp. 5–24.
45. As Endres and Gifﬁn note “although the lack of a statistically signiﬁcant correlation does not disprove standard
innovation theory, it nonetheless implies that the presumed link between intellectual property rights and plant
innovationmay not be as direct as previously thought and warrants further empirical research. This is of particular
importance in the agricultural context, in which plant variety protection engenders complex issues of equity,
subsistence farmers’ rights, and government-sanctioned monopolization by multinational corporations of the
basic building blocks of the human food supply.” See Endres and Gifﬁn (2012), p. 208.
46. The Heckscher–Ohlin model is a general equilibrium mathematical model of international trade that expects
countries to export goods produced by their cheap and abundant factors of production and import goods that use
countries’ scarce factors. Note also that trade beneﬁts accruing to developing countries depend on the size of their
economies. For an understanding see Hirsch (2011), pp. 234–6.
47. Note that “economic development” differs from “economic growth.” The ﬁrst is a normative concept and is
measured by the Human Development Index, whilst the second is a narrower concept measured by the GDP. For
further discussion see Chon (2006), pp. 2821–912.
48. Source: Servicio Agrıcola y Ganadero (Agriculture and Livestock Service). Available at <http://www.sag.cl/
ambitos-de-accion/proteccion-derechos-del-obtentor> [Accessed August 2015]. Data were last updated on 13
July 2015 and the ﬁgures do not distinguish between provisional and deﬁnitive titles.
49. Public institutions may be funded from private funds, but their largest ﬁnancial assistance comes from public
entities such as the Ministry of Agriculture.
50. For native plants in Chile see Timothy et al. (1961), p. 5.
51. Please, note that beans, maize, potatoes, wheat are native plants of Chile; triticale is a hybrid (barley& rye) created
by Norman Borlaug during the Green Revolution whilst most of the remaining plants originate in the
Mediterranean Europe and some in Eastern Europe.
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52. For cultivated agricultural plant species see the EU Plant Variety Catalogue as an example. Available at <http://
ec.europa.eu/food/plant/plant_propagation_material/plant_variety_catalogues_databases/search/public/index.
cfm?event=SearchForm&ctl_type=A> [Accessed August 2015].
53. To be noted that farmers are often dependent on marketed seeds and subsistence farmers lack the resources to
breed high quality seeds.
54. World bank data show a constant number of undernourished people in Chile in the recent decades. Available at
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SN.ITK.DEFC.ZS?page=2> [Accessed January 2016].
55. See also Evangelical Church (2013).
56. This is because contrary to patents, breeder’s rights contain an exemption that allows breeding with protected
material.
57. Transportation systems, market structure, poverty and distribution issues play a major role.
58. For general considerations on subsidies see Lee (2011), pp. 297, 305, whilst for an elaboration of subsidies in
agriculture see Ragavan (2012) pp. 319–29.
59. The database of US farm subsidies is available at <http://farm.ewg.org/>. [Accessed August 2015].
60. Bryan Mercurio suggests that developing countries should create frameworks in which IPRs are viewed as a tool
for development. Mercurio (2011), p. 72.
61. The incentive for PVP comes from the breeding industry, not from farmers. Western farmers, however, are
economically advantaged compared to small farmers in developing countries. Moreover, indigenous peoples are
less numerous in Europe.
62. It has been noted that the Green Revolution did not bring beneﬁts to small-scale farmers in developing countries
though it advantaged those of developed countries. Ragavan (2007), pp. 324–5.
63. Chon argues that developing countries often experience negative social-welfare effects when harmonizing IP
rules, Chon (2014), p. 257.
64. <http://www.upov.int/about/en/faq.html#Q13> [Accessed August 2015].
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